

VICTIM INTERVENTION MARKETING: AN APPLICATION OF SOCIAL ACTIVIST MARKETING IN OPPOSITION TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING

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Human trafficking's most authoritative definitions suffer from internal inconsistencies and *exploitation creep*. This difficulty has caused all trafficking, rather than only its worst forms, to be categorized as slavery. We use victims' voluntary, semivoluntary, and involuntary participation in human trafficking marketing channels and their related attitude-behavior consistencies to redefine human trafficking. This definition forms the conceptual foundation for a victim typology matrix, within which Frazier and Sheth's (1985) influence strategies prescribe interventions. A sample of 190 United Nations' cases supports the typology, and Chi-Square test results indicate a statistically strong relationship between the conditions under which victims enter and remain in human trafficking channels.

There is much documented evidence of human trafficking as a modern day pandemic. Human trafficking affects between 4 and 27 million (U.S. Department of State 2007) victims per year. Its marketing systems commercially exploit vulnerable populations (Bales and Soodalter 2009, p. 83; Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg 2005; Ringold 2005) for sex, labor, organs, and more (Pennington, Ball, Hampton, and Soulakova 2009). Victims have included child soldiers (Batstone 2007, p. 89), farm hands and fishermen in Africa (U.S. Department of State 2007 p. 9), water-carriers in Haiti (Batstone 2007), hair braiders in New Jersey, Chinese circus performers in Las Vegas, deaf Mexican street vendors in New York, and an African religious boys' choir in Texas (Bales and Soodalter 2009, p. 117).

Accordingly, as human trafficking occurs within the context of modern marketing systems (Pennington et al. 2009), it is suggested that marketing theory be

developed toward the goal of understanding it and developing counter strategies. The purpose of this discussion, therefore, is to define human trafficking in the context of marketing channels and to present Victim Intervention Marketing (hereafter Intervention Marketing) as a framework for theory development in that area.

PROBLEMS WITH EXTANT DEFINITIONS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

The United Nations' Palermo Protocol of 2000 (UNODC 2000 [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime], p. 41) and the U.S. Department of State, through the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, appear to offer the most generally accepted definitions of human trafficking. They present it as "slavery" and "near-slavery" involving "force," "fraud," "coercion," and victim "exploitation" (See Tables 1 and 2). Thus, force might entail abduction and enslavement. Fraud might entail tricking a naïve job-seeker into a brothel, and coercion might entail threatening an uncooperative victim's loved ones. The connection between force and coercion is that the former fulfills the latter. For instance, a trafficker may threaten violence and then engage in it.

However, there are problems with the U.S. and UN definitions. As legal scholar Janie Chuang (2012) explains, parts of the Palermo Protocol "were left intentionally vague for the sake of achieving global consensus." Thus, for instance, "What is called 'trafficking' when it involves sex is often called 'international

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Table 1
United Nations Palermo Protocol of 2000 and TVPA of 2000 Definitions of Human Trafficking

**UN Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime and the Protocols Thereto (Excerpt)**

For the purposes of this Protocol:

- (a) "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;
- (b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used.

Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 (Excerpt)

The TVPA defines "severe forms of trafficking" as:

- (a) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age; or
- (b) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.

Table 2
U.S. Government Definitions of Force, Fraud, Coercion and Human Trafficking

Force: can involve the use of physical restraint or serious physical harm. Physical violence, including rape, beatings, and physical confinement, is often employed as a means to control victims, especially during the early stages of victimization, when the trafficker breaks down the victim's resistance.

Fraud: involves false promises regarding employment, wages, working conditions, or other matters. For example, individuals might travel to another country under the promise of well-paying work at a farm or factory only to find themselves manipulated into forced labor. Others might reply to advertisements promising modeling, nanny, or service industry jobs overseas, but be forced into prostitution once they arrive at their destination.

Coercion: can involve threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; any scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; or the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process.

Human Trafficking: Victims are forced, defrauded, or coerced into trafficking. Even if victims initially offer consent, that consent is rendered meaningless by the actions of the traffickers to exploit them for labor, services, or commercial sex. Human trafficking is a crime committed against an individual. Trafficking need not entail the physical movement of a person.

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: Office of Refugee Resettlement.

labor migration' when it involves other kinds of work" (Chuang 2010). Weitzer (2014) explained that, "Definitional problems plague ... discussions of human trafficking." Thus, Brazil, for instance, does not require force, fraud, or coercion in its definition of sex trafficking (Blanchette and Silva 2012, p. 114).

Consistent with the above, the UN and U.S. definitions of human trafficking are problematic for two reasons. First, they address only "severe" forms of human trafficking (U.S. Department of State 2009). This is a problem because they omit trafficking's milder forms. For instance,

there is a difference between performing a job as an imprisoned slave (severe) and performing it voluntarily for low pay (less severe). This is consistent with Weitzer's (2014) observation that human trafficking situations "range from highly coercive and exploitive to cooperative, consensual, and mutually beneficial relationships" and that there are "complex gray areas in between the two poles" (Weitzer 2014). The second problem with the U.S. and UN definitions is that they equate all debt bondage with slavery. However, as will be discussed, debt bondage is often voluntary, while slavery never is.

The Problem with Debt Bondage

There are discrepancies in the debt bondage trafficking literature. Sometimes it is treated as an involuntary arrangement, while in other cases it is presented as voluntary. The U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (hereafter TVPA) identifies debt bondage as a type of human trafficking, and defines it as “the status or condition of a debtor arising from a pledge by the debtor of his or her personal services or of those of a person under his or her control as a security for debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined.” Thus, since the definition speaks of victims’ pledges, which are voluntary, then logically so is debt bondage. Under this voluntary arrangement, victims agree in advance to settle their accounts with labor, without knowing when the contract terms will end. Thus, one may work for the rest of his/her life, and even pass his debt along to his children (UNICEF 2014).

Debt bondage is often an egregious practice. However, apparently sometimes victims are volunteers who know when the job will end, as in the following UNODC criminal case excerpts. “The debts owed by the women and thereby the gross value of their work during the period was in the order of \$81,000 to \$94,000 each [para. 28]. The duration of the contracts would depend on how quickly the women serviced the required number of clients to erase the debt” (UNODC 2009). Thus, the defendants were found guilty of debt bondage, even though the duration of service had an identifiable end point. Similarly, in UNODC case *R v Netthip* 2010 NSWDC 159, the defendant lent money at a high interest rate (UNODC 2010), the victims worked it off, and the arrangement ended with all sides apparently content. No one had been cheated, harmed, or threatened. This is consistent with Bélanger’s (2014) observation that some trafficked migrant workers “did not report experiences of abuse, deception, or severe exploitation.” Accordingly, then, debt bondage appears to be a voluntary arrangement.

On the other hand, however, there is evidence that debt bondage is involuntary. The UN and U.S. define debt bondage as human trafficking, and they define human trafficking as an involuntary arrangement. Moreover, there is substantial anecdotal evidence in the TIP Reports (U.S. Department of State 2013), in

Kara’s (2012) discussion, and in other sources, of involuntary debt bondage.

The reality is that both forms exist. As Weitzer (2014) explained, debt bondage migrant workers “fall along a broad spectrum.” At one end, there are “individuals who have been thoroughly deceived ... passports confiscated ... sexually abused.” While, at the other end, there are those who “operate with full knowledge and agency and who are not deceived or mistreated by facilitators or employers.” Busza (2004) and Sandy (2009) see debt bondage on a continuum as well.

Accordingly, consistent with Weitzer’s (2014) call to disaggregate indebtedness, we identify two types of debt bondage: Simple Debt Bondage and Fraudulent Debt Bondage. Each exploits and abuses a vulnerable population, which qualifies it as human trafficking. However, the latter is worse than the former.

Simple Debt Bondage

Simple Debt Bondage is defined as *an exploitive loan/labor arrangement for which the victim volunteers, and for which he is fully informed regarding the terms, in the absence of force, fraud, or coercion*. It occurs when the terms of the loan (e.g., interest rate, duration, and job tasks) are highly burdensome. Thus, any force or coercion would inure from the harsh economic realities that led the victim to seek debt bondage. However, the trafficker does not mediate that force. It is a function of munificence in the channel’s output sector (Dwyer and Oh 1987). Here, victims knowingly enlist for exploitive work so they can earn money to survive.

Fraudulent Debt Bondage

Fraudulent Debt Bondage *differs from the simple arrangement in that at some point the victim is forced, defrauded, or coerced*. For instance, victims voluntarily agree to the terms of the contract, discover they have been tricked, and end up as the trafficker’s slaves or *near slaves*. The victims may remain in the channel because they were physically confined, or to protect the family’s honor, and so forth. In some instances, the victim inherits the debt and, thereby, remains involuntarily. Either way, however, the victims and/or their progeny suffer because of loan terms to which neither agreed. Every debt bondage arrangement, then, begins with a

victim's voluntary participation, whether or not it ends that way.

Revisiting Force, Fraud, and Coercion

Ambiguities in the UN and U.S. definitions of human trafficking, then, have apparently led researchers and humanitarian anti-trafficking groups to offer definitions that overlook the relative nature of severity and victims who volunteered. Accordingly, most or all definitions now present force, fraud, coercion, involuntary servitude, and slavery as necessary conditions for all human trafficking, rather than for only its worst forms. Clearly, trafficking victims often experience those ills, but they do not all necessarily experience them. Many are exploited because they volunteered for the arrangement in ignorance, as with fraud, because they were financially desperate, or because they sought glamorous work as models, and so forth (Archer 2013). Traffickers did not necessarily force, defraud, or coerce them. The UN and U.S. definitions are not mere oversights, however. Rather, they stem from mandates to address only trafficking's severe forms, not its less severe ones (U.S. Department of State 2009, p. 11). However, as Chuang (2012) explains, "Trafficking has now come to be understood as falling somewhere along a spectrum of abusive labor practices."

Accordingly, voluntary participation (victim's "consent" in the UN Protocol of 2000) is inconsistent with force, coercion, slavery, or fraudulent debt bondage. Involuntary participation is inconsistent with simple debt bondage, as victims do not volunteer for slavery. However, economic desperation drives them to volunteer for near slavery working conditions, which is endemic to human trafficking. Victims also voluntarily participate in simple debt bondage, but they do not volunteer for debt bondage scams wherein they are defrauded out of pay for their labor. Similarly, victims may be tricked into agreeing to be trafficked, but they do not volunteer to be forced or coerced.

Such ambiguities and inconsistencies in the U.S. and UN definitions exemplify Vandenberg's (2012), Chuang's (2012), and others' descriptions of recent human trafficking research as a "rigor-free" zone, which includes trafficking's definitions. The UN and U.S. definitions of human trafficking, therefore, present two problems for social marketers. First, they are internally inconsistent. Second, they were designed to help fulfill law enforcement's mandates (Sychoy 2009)

and, as such, are less useful to opponents of all forms of human trafficking.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING REDEFINED

Pennington et al. (2009) discussed cross-border human trafficking. Consistent with the Palermo Protocol of 2000 they defined it as "the movement of people across international borders for the purpose of involuntary servitude [enslavement]." They also suggest that there are many definitions of human trafficking, all of which entail some form of egregious behavior toward victims.

Accordingly, this discussion defines human trafficking from a marketing channels perspective, whether within or across international borders. An explanation of each main concept follows the definition: *Human trafficking involves the activities of an egregious, interorganizational, opportunistic, marketing distribution system wherein people (or their organs) are treated as products or property. All other things equal, egregiousness (severity of abuse) ranges from relatively low under voluntary participation, where fraud is often employed, to relatively high, where traffickers use force and coercion to elicit involuntary participation (slavery).*

Definition Components

Egregiousness

In this discussion, channel severity is conceptualized as egregiousness. In the corporate social responsibility and marketing literature, egregiousness involves a firm's "conduct that is strikingly wrong and that has negative and possibly harmful consequences for various parties (e.g., workers, consumers, society at large)" (Klein, Smith, and John 2004). It is "intolerable, monstrous, shocking, outrageous, highly reprehensible" behavior (Cisse-Depardon and N'Goala 2009). Thus, egregious behavior clearly fits the context for human trafficking.

Essentially all human trafficking involves exploitation and abuse of a vulnerable population. Its least egregious form targets volunteers (with or without fraud), while its most egregious form forces or coerces victims to participate in the channel. However, the boundary between the lowest level of egregiousness and its complete absence is determined subjectively (Chuang 2012). For instance, an abused, voluntary indentured servant is a trafficking victim if the levels of abuse and/or the terms of the debt are excessive.

However, that threshold is determined according to societal norms. Currently, this decision is made on a case-by-case basis in the courts.

As most people value more control over their lives than less, however, it is proposed that, all other things equal (not considering job tasks), involuntary participation is trafficking's most egregious form. Semivoluntary participation from social pressure is less egregious, and least egregious is voluntary participation.

The proposed definition, therefore, is only partially consistent with those of the UN and the United States for two reasons. First, their conceptual definitions are internally inconsistent in the areas of debt bondage (i.e., "bonded labor," [Kara 2012 p. 4]), voluntary participation, slavery, and so forth. Second, it is clear from anecdotal evidence (UNODC 2014) that many victims initially volunteered. For instance, there is a case about a Nepalese woman who agreed to work in a factory, but who was instead forced into a brothel (Simkhada 2008).

Interorganizational System

Human trafficking systems are interorganizational, in that at least two parties are always involved, the trafficker and the victim. Thus, a trafficking channel may be indirect, where a recruiter supplies victims via middlemen, or it may be direct. Accordingly, under such governance structures as corporate vertical marketing systems, the trafficking organization may play different roles at multiple points throughout the channel.

There is also evidence that criminal organizations use such traditional interorganizational management strategies as vertical integration. For instance, anecdotal evidence suggests that certain mafia groups act as captains for European sex trafficking channels. Thus, it is suggested that marketing distribution channels theory, particularly involving conceptual frameworks by Frazier and Sheth (1985); Achrol, Reve, and Stern (1983); Boyle et al. (1992) and others, potentially offer insights into the analysis of human trafficking channels.

Opportunism

Opportunism "refers to a lack of candor or honesty in transactions, to include self-interest seeking with guile" (Williamson, 1975, p. 9). Opportunism is common in human trafficking channels, where victims are often treated as the trafficker's property.

Slavery

The United States and UN present "slavery" and "modern day slavery" as synonymous with human trafficking. However, the proposed definition treats slavery as but one type, or level, of trafficking. All slavery (involuntary servitude under conditions of force or coercion) is human trafficking, but not all human trafficking is slavery. Some human trafficking involves near slavery because of the victims' limited freedom, deplorable working conditions, and so forth. Moreover, not all deplorable working conditions qualify as human trafficking because they are not egregious enough. Thus, human trafficking severity (e.g., slavery vs. near slavery) is a matter of degree. Accordingly, our approach is consistent with Chuang's (2012) suggestion and Weitzer's (2014) and Andrees's (2014) agreement that human trafficking conceptualizations avoid exploitation creep, wherein trafficking-related practices are labeled as more extreme than is legally accurate. Thus, there can be a slippery slope from workplace unfairness to exploitation, from exploitation to trafficking, and from trafficking to modern day slavery, with commensurate over-sensationalizing. As Chuang (2012) explains, "Through exploitation creep, the concept of 'slavery' is now fully conflated ... with trafficking."

Prostitution

The proposed definition does not single out prostitution or sex work as do the UN and U.S. definitions. The reason is that the UN and the United States specifically (but not uniquely) target sex offenders for law enforcement purposes. However, social marketers may want to employ definitions that apply to all types of abusive channel tasks. This is consistent with Weitzer's (2014) observation that human trafficking analysis tends to focus on sex and pays too little attention to labor.

Accordingly, while most extant definitions of human trafficking emphasize sex trafficking and prostitution, in this discussion not all prostitution is human trafficking. For example, a prostitute who is being exploited by a pimp is being trafficked, whether her participation is, or had been, voluntary. However, a voluntary prostitute who is not being exploited, abused, forced, defrauded, or coerced is not being trafficked. An alternative view is that all prostitution qualifies as human trafficking as it sexually exploits vulnerable populations (Marcin 2013). However,

referring to pimps and prostitutes, Morselli and Savoie-Gargiso (2014) warn that “coercion and control are not as salient in these relationships as is often believed, and that the notion of inherent exploitation must be qualified.”

Human Organ Trafficking

Contrary to the U.S. State Department’s definition, but consistent with the UN’s and Pennington et al.’s (2009) “extraction of body parts,” the definition proposed here subsumes human organ trafficking. It is limited, however, to organs that can be traded multiple times, including: eggs (Fox News 2013; Labadie 2010; Carney 2011, p. 111), surrogate wombs (Carney 2011, p. 135), hair (Carney 2011, p. 221), and blood (Carney 2011, p. 153). Thus, the proposed framework excludes such vital organs as kidneys (Kakutani 2011), lungs, and livers (UNODC 2010), which are normally sold only once. The rationale is that our framework addresses how victims enter and remain in channels, which does not apply to organs that are sold only once.

Voluntary and Involuntary Participation

The voluntary aspect of human trafficking is implied in the Palermo Protocol of 2000, which states: “The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons . . . shall be irrelevant.” Moreover, as stated elsewhere in this discussion, the U.S. State Department’s definition speaks of victims making pledges to debt bondage traffickers, which are also voluntary. There is also much anecdotal evidence of people agreeing to be trafficked because of financial desperation (U.S. Department of State 2009), or because they want to travel, wear fashionable clothing, buy a home, start a business, and so on (Chin 2013, pp. 98, 117, 176). Jacobsen and Skilbrei (2010, p. 190) found that many Russian women who were selling sex in Norway were trying to improve their family’s financial status and did not self-identify as passive victims.

VICTIM INTERVENTION MARKETING

Victim Intervention Marketing is proposed as an application of Murray’s (1997) social activist marketing, which is a subset of social marketing (Kotler, Roberto,

and Lee 2002, p. 3) involving “(1) more important and socially divisive issues, (2) conflict between the social marketer and the target, and (3) greater reliance upon coercive influence strategies such as boycotts, protests, strikes, etc.” Thus, the goal of intervention marketing is to employ aggressive social activist-type tactics to disrupt or sabotage human trafficking distribution channels for the victim’s benefit.

Victim Intervention Marketing Defined

Victim Intervention Marketing is *that branch of social activist marketing that uses traditional and nontraditional marketing techniques to prevent or end a vulnerable population’s introduction into, or continuance in, a human trafficking distribution channel. Thus, it entails efforts to assist both current and potential trafficking channel participants, where the latter is at substantial risk of abuse by a trafficker.* A current victim might be someone who was tricked into enslavement in a factory, and a potential participant would be someone who is following a similar path. An example of nontraditional social marketing techniques would be the Kony 2012 anti-trafficking campaign. In this instance, Invisible Children presented child soldier victims as normal children who wanted to go to school and live without fear of abduction. The video stimulated much discussion (Wasserman 2012) and was followed up with a Cover the Night poster campaign. Volunteers bought the posters online and posted them, instead of that work being done by professionals. Thus, millions of young people placed the posters on April 20th, a day traditionally dedicated to smoking marijuana (Grim 2013). This activity offered a more socially acceptable alternative for young people.

THE ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOR FRAMEWORK FOR VICTIM INTERVENTION MARKETING

Through a process of induction, we created a framework based on the attitudes, beliefs, and behavioral commonalities that connect human trafficking’s key components: force, fraud, and coercion. Accordingly, it was determined that force and coercion elicit the victim’s involuntary participation (behavior) in the face of negative attitudes and beliefs. Fraud encourages favorable attitudes and beliefs, which lead to voluntary participation. Finally, significant others (e.g., relatives,

spiritual leaders, and/or boyfriends) may use the victim's sense of guilt, loyalty (Polaris Project 2014), and so forth to elicit a victim's semivoluntary participation. Each mode of participation will be discussed in turn.

Voluntary Channel Participation

In this discussion, acknowledging voluntary participation in a channel is not intended to blame the victim. Rather, it identifies the origin of the victim's plight toward the goal of helping others in the future. Accordingly, a victim's voluntary participation in a trafficking channel may stem from free choice with or without deception. In the first instance, the individual is tricked into a bad situation, agrees to the exploitive terms out of economic desperation, or seeks adventure through overseas work (Jacobsen and Skilbrei 2010, p. 190). This assertion is consistent with Chin and Finckenauer's (2012) finding that in a sample of over 100 trafficked Chinese women, none reported any force, fraud, or coercion.

Voluntary participation presumes the channel candidate's reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) in the context of multiple attributes (Fishbein and Ajzen 1980). Thus, the decision to participate (behavioral intention) is based on the sum of positive and negative attitudes toward several variables (e.g., money, personal safety, personal reputation), the importance of each variable, and the opinions of significant others.

Victims hold at least two attitudes at the point of channel entry (Pennington et al.'s 2009 "recruitment node"). First is their attitude toward the job tasks, and second is their attitude toward the act or consequences of performing those tasks. However, consistent with Frazier and Sheth's (1985) focus on the channel member's "attitude toward a behavior" rather than on his attitude toward the object (i.e., job tasks), this discussion treats the victim's attitude toward the act (consequences) of joining the channel as the driving force behind his participation. Accordingly, the victim who participates voluntarily will have either a positive or negative attitude toward performing the channel tasks. The individual will have a positive attitude toward their consequences (e.g. money, self-esteem, etc.). Consistency between the victim's beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors, is, therefore, more likely to occur in the presence of fraud and less likely in its absence.

Voluntary channel participation includes debt bondage and its job-related attitudes. For instance, the victim may dislike the type of work, but may like the terms of the loan. Similarly, the victim may dislike both, but may like their consequences. However, overall, the victim who agrees to debt bondage in the absence of force, fraud, or coercion has an overall positive attitude toward the consequences of taking on the job and the debt.

Involuntary Channel Participation

In this case, the victim's attitudes toward the work, its consequences, and any related beliefs and behaviors are consistently negative. Examples would include the trans-Atlantic slave trade, abductees for child soldiering in Africa, forced street gang participation (Walker-Barnes and Mason 2001), involuntary blood *donors* in India (Carney 2011, p. 153), Japanese "Comfort Women" (Brooks 1999, p. 5), victims of the Nazi labor camps (Brooks 1999, pp. 33, 68) during World War II, and others.

Semivoluntary Channel Participation

The semivoluntary victim has a negative attitude toward the job tasks (e.g., type of work, hours, etc.) and their direct consequences. In this case, the money is not worth the undesirable work. However, pressure from a relative or other person (Weitzer 2014), involving a strong subjective norm (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, p. 301), results in a positive attitude toward the indirect consequences of the job (i.e. pleasing the significant other). The victim has conflicting feelings about taking the job. The individual wants to avoid the undesirable work, but wants also to please a significant other by accepting it. Conflicting feelings have been addressed in the literature by Priester and Petty (1996), Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla (1995), Prislín, Wood, and Pool (1998), and others.

Consistent with the findings of Asch (1940) and Wood (2000), the significant other will probably encourage her attitude toward the act of joining the channel (i.e., engaging in the undesirable work) by reframing what the channel tasks symbolize. Thus, for example, the woman who turns tricks for her boyfriend's benefit is not an immoral prostitute as others

might label her. Rather, the boyfriend frames her as a loyal and responsible partner who should feel proud.

Instances of semivoluntary participation may also involve a multigenerational debt bondage scheme, wherein victims remain enslaved because of a sense of obligation to pay off a parent's debt (Batstone 2007) or fulfill a religious obligation. An example would be donating one's hair to profit the Tirumala Temple in India (Carney 2011, p. 221).

Accordingly, a victim may join a channel despite a negative attitude toward the direct consequences of the work (i.e., money). However, in contrast, the victim may have a positive attitude toward the indirect consequence of pleasing a significant other. All other things equal, the individual will join the channel if the latter outweighs the former.

MANAGERIAL APPLICATION OF FRAZIER AND SHETH'S MODEL

Frazier and Sheth's (1985) attitude-behavior consistency model offers guidelines for applying influence strategies in channels (see Table 3). It is based on the participant's attitudes and behaviors toward a given channel program. For instance, a manufacturer may want a retailer to offer its new product, and the retailer may or may not want to do it.

The retailer may or may not have a positive attitude toward offering it (behavioral intention). However, because attitudes and behaviors are not always consistent, the retailer may like the idea and implement it, or he may like it but not implement it, and so on. Thus, Frazier and Sheth's (1985) model offers six decision-making contexts. They are based on three attitude positions (positive, neutral, and negative) and two behaviors (participation or nonparticipation) in the channel program. Each cell in the framework prescribes influence strategies to employ with the target, including for instance, "reinforcement," "confrontation," and so forth (see Tables 4 and 5).

Basing our framework on Frazier and Sheth's (1985), we used a process of deduction to create an attitude-behavior consistency framework for human trafficking settings, with the following exceptions. First, our framework omits neutral attitudes toward channel participation; it is unlikely that a person facing a trafficking situation would be indifferent toward it. Second, Frazier and Sheth (1985) omit the target's beliefs about the channel program. However, this discussion includes

them because they provide a clearer sense of the victim's balance (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, p. 32) between attitudes, behavior, and beliefs. Therefore, the framework addresses these three important components that potentially offer insight into victims' approaches to trafficking channels.

EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THE VICTIM TYPOLOGY

To assess the real world applicability of the proposed matrix, 190 UNODC human trafficking cases (1995 to 2011) were each categorized into the nine cells by three raters who followed a rubric. At the time of our analysis, the UNODC Human Trafficking Case Law Database contained 230 cases from over 30 countries. They included both genders, adults and children, labor, sex, and organ trafficking. The database described cases in terms of *action* (e.g., recruitment, transport, etc.), *means* (e.g., fraud, force, threats), and *purpose* (i.e., sex vs. labor exploitation; UNODC 2014).

Consistent with standard intercoder reliability procedures (Hughes and Garrett 1990), three researchers read each case narrative and coded it for how the victim both entered and remained in the channel (1 = Voluntary, 2 = Semi-Voluntary, and 3 = Involuntary). Intercoder discrepancies were discussed until either a consensus was reached or the case was omitted from the sample. Discrepancies typically resulted from insufficient details in the narrative to permit categorization. Thus, all cases in the final dataset (N = 190 out of 230) were based on consensus among the three raters.

Statistical Analysis

The null hypothesis in this exploratory study was that there is no relationship between the means (voluntary, semivoluntary, or involuntary) by which a victim enters the channel and the means by which the victim remains in it. The results of a Chi-Square test of the 3 x 3 matrix of influence strategies and victims' situations indicated a strong relationship between how victims entered the channel (e.g., voluntarily, etc.) and how they remain in it (Chi-Square test statistic = 22, degrees of freedom = 4, p = 0.000). The results are as follows.

Roughly 30 percent of those who entered the channel voluntarily remained in it voluntarily, with 64

Table 3
Intervention Marketer's Influence Strategies and Tactics

Reinforcement: This strategy would be used when the marketing channel participant (the victim) has a positive attitude toward the intervention marketer's channel program and behaves in accordance with it. Here, the intervention marketer would reinforce the participant's efforts toward leaving the channel.

Rationalization: The channel manager uses this when the participant has a negative attitude toward participation, but participates anyway. For instance, a woman in India may not want to donate her hair to traffickers. So, the intervention marketer might leverage her attitude to dissuade her from future participation.

Information Exchange: Here, the channel manager offers information to persuade the potential victim to participate (or to continue) in the channel. For instance, an intervention marketer might inform a cross-border victim of his rights in the new location.

Modeling: occurs when the channel manager tells a participant to pattern his or her behavior after that of some other participant. Thus an intervention marketer might encourage a victim to escape as some other one had.

Recommendation: Here, the channel manager encourages the potential victim to participate in the channel program. For instance, an intervention marketer might recommend that a victim not trust the trafficker, who may be posing as an employment agent, etc.

Warning: The channel manager warns the potential participant that failure to comply will result in punishment. However, intervention marketers would not want to use this with victims.

Confrontation: An intervention marketer might use *moderate confrontation* with a victim who is considering joining a trafficking channel, and *radical confrontation* if the victim actually decides to participate in it.

Negative and Positive Normative: Here, an intervention marketer might encourage a victim who has a positive attitude and behavioral intention regarding participation by telling them it is, for instance, socially acceptable to be a disloyal girlfriend to a loved one who wants her to work at a dangerous job.

Rewards and Punishments: These are arranged by the channel manager and levied upon the victim. Intervention marketers may use both economic and noneconomic rewards for victim behavior that is consistent with leaving the channel.

Personal Plea: Sometimes channel managers use the power of their personal relationships with targets, to influence their channel participation. Thus, an intervention marketer might use personal pleas with victims, to dissuade their trafficking channel participation.

Promises and Threats: Intervention marketers would not threaten victim participants, but instead would make bona fide promises of better employment, etc. to encourage the victim to leave the channel or not to enter it in the first place.

Legalistic Reference: Human trafficking channel managers routinely withhold victims' passports, and warn them that should they escape and go to the host-country police, they will suffer even more from law enforcement, who dislike illegal immigrants. Intervention marketers would do the opposite. They would inform victims of their legal rights.

Inducement: In some cases, the potential victim likes the idea of joining the intervention marketer's channel program, but declines participation in it. The reason may be others' opinions (i.e., subjective norm). Here, the intervention marketers may offer such inducements as small amounts of money to dissuade a financially desperate person from joining the channel.

Request: Here, the channel manager expresses his or her wishes regarding the victim or potential victim's participation in the channel. However, they do not threaten or take a hard-sell approach. For instance, a wealthy family in a poor country may ask a poorer family to give them one of the children to raise, educate, etc. These have the potential to become exploitive, as is seen among the so-called "Restavek" children of Haiti.

Free-Market Solutions: In instances where a person voluntarily joins an exploitive channel, as in the case of debt bondage, one way to liberate them is for the intervention marketer to pay off the debt to the channel manager.

Cultural Pluralism (Information Exchange): In some cases (e.g., temple hair donation in India, or in China where it is dishonorable not to pay off a debt bondage), the intervention marketer should consider dissuading the victim's trafficking channel participation. This might be achieved by informing him/her that in other parts of the world, it is the debt bondage trafficker who would be shamed, not the victim.

Liberation Theology (Information Exchange): This strategy is based on principles set forth by Fr. Gustavo Gutierrez (1988). In the context of human trafficking, a personal plea or information exchange would be supported with religious doctrine (e.g., the victim's right to freedom).

Heretical Imperative: Based on Peter Berger's (1980) discussion, in pluralistic societies where one must choose among alternative belief systems, any choice becomes heretical in someone else's estimation, no matter what the choice is. Thus, an intervention marketer might consider encouraging a victim who has been pressured by a significant other to rethink accepting their *karma* or fate. They might explain that what is orthodox and right is a subjective assessment.

Table 4
Egregiousness, Attitude-Belief-Behavior Consistency by Victim Segment, and Intervention Influence Strategy

	<u>(Low Rel. Egregiousness)</u>	<u>(Moderate Rel. Egregiousness)</u>	<u>(High Rel. Egregiousness)</u>
	<u>Voluntary Continuance</u> Attitude (Act) + Attitude (J) -/+ Beliefs (J) -/+ Behavior (J) +	<u>Semi-voluntary Continuance</u> Attitude (Act) + Attitude (J) - Beliefs (J) - Behavior (J) +	<u>Involuntary Continuance</u> Attitude (Act) - Attitude (J) - Beliefs (J) - Behavior (J) -
Attitude (Act) + Attitude (J) -/+ Beliefs (J) -/+ Behavior (J) + Voluntary Introduction <i>(Low Relative Egregiousness)</i>	Willing Assimilators (25%) IM: Radical Confrontation Change Beliefs & Attitude Add Attributes to Consider	Disillusioned Contrastors (5%) IM: Inducement Negative Norm. Against Trafficker Economic & Nonecon. Rewards Request, Counter Info. Exchange Support Contrasts, Free-Market	Tricked and Trapped (54%) IM: Inducement Negative Norm. Against Trafficker Economic & Nonecon. Rewards Requests
Attitude (Act) + Attitude (J) - Beliefs (J) - Behavior (J) + Semi-Voluntary Introduction <i>(Mod. Relative Egregiousness)</i>	Peaceful Displacers (0%) IM: Radical Confrontation Counter Argue Pos. & Neg. Beliefs, Rational Appeal Change Attitude to Negative	Responsible Martyrs (3%) IM: Inducement Negative Norm. Against Trafficker Economic & Nonecon. Rewards Requests, Counter Info. Exchange Free-Market, Cultural Pluralism Change Beliefs to Negative	Enlightened Apostates (8%) IM: Inducement Negative Norm. Against Trafficker Economic & Nonecon. Rewards Requests, Counter Info. Exchange Encourage & Facilitate Flight
Attitude (Act) - Attitude (J) - Beliefs (J) - Behavior (J) - Involuntary Introduction <i>(High Relative Egregiousness)</i>	Stockholmers (0%) IM: Moderate Confrontation Modeling, Recommendation, Warning, Pos. & Neg. Norm. Nonecon. Reward, Request, Plea, Promise	Karmic Acceptors (1%) IM: Inducement Negative Normative Against Trafficker Econ. & Nonecon. Rewards Requests, Counter Info. Exchange Liberation Theology Heretical Imperative	Trapped and Robbed (5%) IM: Inducement Negative Norm. Against Trafficker Economic & Nonecon. Rewards Requests, Counter Info. Exchange Encourage & Facilitate Flight

Notes: Attitude (J) = Victim's attitude toward performing the job/channel tasks;
Attitude (Act) = Victim's attitude toward the act or consequences of accepting the job;
Beliefs (J) = Victim's beliefs about the nature of the job/channel tasks;
Behavior (J) = Victim's behavioral intention to perform the job/channel tasks.
Cells: Top: Name of Trafficking Victim Segment and Percentages based on UNODC data (N = 190);
Middle: IM = Name of Intervention Marketer's Influence Strategy;
Bottom: Details of Influence Strategy.
(P = .000 for Chi-Square Significance).

percent remaining involuntarily. Thus, roughly three quarters of initial volunteers experienced opposition when they wanted to leave the channel, and the majority of them were held captive. In such instances, traffickers often confiscate victims' passports, physically confine or threaten them, or otherwise detain them. See Table 6.

Most of the victims (71%) who entered semivoluntarily under social pressure subsequently found themselves in a worse situation of being held involuntarily. As anticipated, the majority (82%) of those who entered involuntarily under force or coercion remained involuntarily. Eighteen percent remained in the channel semivoluntarily. In other words, these Karmic Acceptors experienced an attitudinal

change toward being in the channel because of the influence of a significant other.

Overall, 84 percent of victims entered the channel voluntarily, either because they were tricked or because they were financially desperate. Roughly one out of ten (11%) victims entered semivoluntarily under pressure, while about half of that number (6%) entered involuntarily. This last group included abductees and those sold by a significant other.

One out of four (25%) of all victims remained in the channel voluntarily, while the remaining 75 percent remained either because of social pressure (9%), or because of force or coercion (66%). Thus, while the risk of remaining in a channel is highest if one enters



Table 5
Descriptions of Victim Segments and Relevant Influence Strategies

Willing Assimilators (25%): comprise roughly 25% of the nine types of trafficking victims and 30% of initial volunteers. They join the channel either out of economic desperation (e.g., debt bondage) or a sense of adventure. They may or may not have been defrauded into joining, but they have not been coerced or forced. They assimilate (Sherif and Hovland 1961) the channel's negative aspects into their psyches. They share a positive attitude toward the consequences of performing the job tasks (e.g., money). Consistent with the findings of Frazier and Sheth (1985), intervention marketers should offer them persuasive information to encourage departure from the channel. For instance they might *inform* the victim that the job exposes him to toxic fumes, etc.

Disillusioned Contrastors (5%): comprise about 5% of all trafficking victims and 6% of initial volunteers. They enter the channel voluntarily, but are subsequently pressured into remaining in it. This may happen because of debt bondage, shame, drug addiction, a close relationship with the trafficker, etc. They are former Willing Assimilators for whom the *honeymoon* has ended. Thus, the unanticipated hardships are no longer assimilated, but contrasted (Sherif and Hovland 1961) as the disillusioned victim perceives a bleak situation. Consistent with the findings of Frazier and Sheth (1985), the intervention marketer should use *Negative Normative* influence strategies to persuade the victim to leave the situation. For instance, the marketer might persuade the victim to perceive the trafficker as evil.

Tricked and Trapped (54%): victims comprise 54% of all victims and 64% of initial volunteers. They may or may not be former Willing Assimilators or Disillusioned Contrastors. An example would be a debt bondage victim who was not permitted to leave after the agreed upon terms had been met. The intervention marketer should use such economic and noneconomic rewards (Frazier and Sheth 1985) as food and friendship to earn the victim's trust toward the goal of escape or rescue. For instance International Justice Missions (IJM) helps liberate slaves via local judicial systems.

Peaceful Displacers (0%): enter the trafficking channel with a positive attitude toward the consequences of participation, while holding a negative attitude toward the work itself. It is the subjective norm (pleasing a significant other) that makes the consequences of initial participation worth it. For instance, a relative who may or may not be working for the trafficker may pressure, but not threaten, the victim to participate. If the victim subsequently finds that he/she enjoys the work—thereby experiencing an attitude change toward the positive—and continues for reasons other than pressure from a significant other, the victim will become a voluntary participant, despite his semivoluntary entry into the job. This may happen when the victim's expectations were worse than the reality (Engel, Blackwell, and Miniard 1993, p. 571). The intervention marketer in this case should use radical confrontation with the trafficking victim. For instance, the intervention marketer might confront a prostitute with evidence that her pimp is withholding money.

Responsible Martyrs (3%): were pressured into the channel by a significant other, and remain in it for that reason. Responsible Martyrs disliked the type of work, both in the beginning and throughout the course of their employment. They only participate in order to repay a debt, feed a loved one, etc. Consistent with Frazier and Sheth (1985), the intervention marketer will want to use inducements (e.g. meals, clothing, news from home) and/or make references to cultural pluralism as a type of information exchange. The message would be that there are alternative ways to view social obligations, and that they may not have chosen the best one.

Enlightened Apostates (8%): may have joined the trafficking channel as Peaceful Displacers or Responsible Martyrs, but perhaps realized that the trafficker defrauded them at some point. Essentially, Enlightened Apostates had an epiphany and have no misgivings about leaving the channel. They have lost faith in whatever social norms previously held them in psychological bondage to the significant other and now want out. However, at this point, the significant other shows his or her true colors and simply enslaves the victim. Intervention marketers should consider facilitating the Enlightened Apostate's escape from the trafficking channel.

Stockholmers (0%): Stockholm Syndrome victims were initially forced into the channel, but subsequently developed positive affect for their captors (de Fabrique, Romano, and Vecchi 2007). Here, intervention marketers should use moderate confrontation, as radical confrontation may backfire and trigger a protection mechanism in favor of the trafficker. Other options include making promises or using modeling.

Karmic Acceptors (1%): entered the channel with a negative attitude and still hate what they are being forced to do. However, they have accepted their situation as part of a larger, cosmic scheme. For instance, perhaps their new ideology is consistent with the Biblical concept of slaves obeying their masters. Intervention marketers might employ some version of Liberation Theology or Peter Berger's (1980) "Heretical Imperative" here. It would be analogous to the cultural pluralism appeal made to Responsible Martyrs, but from a more spiritual or religious perspective. The goal would be to persuade the victim to consider the situation from an alternative religious viewpoint, and, perhaps, thereby decide to escape.

Trapped and Robbed (5%): victims have been abducted or sold by parents or guardians, etc. They never liked the work into which they were forced, nor did they employ any cultural or religious coping mechanisms to deal with being enslaved. The intervention marketer will want to keep the victim informed on what the free-world is like, and consider facilitating the victim's escape. This segment has been physically trapped and robbed of their freedom. In some cases, they are robbed of organs. For instance, they may agree to sell a pint of blood, a certain number of eggs, etc. only to be imprisoned and their blood stolen in small amounts over time. Very young victims run the risk of suffering from developmental trauma disorder and disassociate to cope with their suffering. They may need to be physically removed from the channel.

Source: UNODC Case Law Database Analysis.

Table 6
Crosstabs: Victim's Human Trafficking Channel Entry and Continuance Modes

Entered (Rows)/Remained (Columns)	Voluntary	Semi-Voluntary	Involuntary	Row Total
Voluntary	n = 48	n = 9	n = 102	n = 159
Percent of Total	25%	5%	54%	84%
Percent of Row	30%	6%	64%	100%
Percent of Column	100%	53%	81%	84%
Semivoluntary	n = 0	n = 6	n = 15	n = 21
Percent of Total	0%	3%	8%	11%
Percent of Row	0%	29%	71%	100%
Percent of Column	0%	35%	12%	11%
Involuntary	n = 0	n = 2	n = 9	n = 11
Percent of Total	0%	1%	5%	6%
Percent of Row	0%	18%	82%	100%
Percent of Column	0%	12%	7%	6%
Column Total	n = 48	n = 17	n = 126	n = 190
Column Pct. of Total	25%	9%	66%	100%

Note: Includes rounding errors.

it involuntarily (82%), the risk ratio of a volunteer who remains involuntarily is $64/82 = 77\%$. This means there is a 77 percent chance that an initial volunteer will end up in the same situation as someone who had been forced into the channel.

Relative Egregiousness

Sixty-eight percent of victims experienced involuntary servitude at some point. This percentage represents the highest level of human trafficking egregiousness in this discussion. Eight percent of victims' worst experience was semivoluntary participation (moderate egregiousness). Twenty-five percent of victims experienced only voluntary participation, which is the least severe (egregious) form of human trafficking in this discussion, all other things equal.

Global Estimates of Egregiousness

There is no definitive global estimate on the current number of human trafficking victims. However, if the 27 million count stated previously is accurate, then 18 million (68%) victims experienced the worst form of human trafficking. The worst experience for 2 million (8%) victims was moderately egregious. Finally, 7 million victims had no negative experiences beyond the

lowest level of egregiousness, as their participation had been solely voluntary.

Limitations of the Study

One of the limitations of the empirical aspect of this study is that the UNODC case narratives sometimes omitted details regarding the circumstances that led to victimization. For instance, the narrative might have indicated that a woman approached a trafficker for work, but not indicate whether she had been pressured to approach him. Thus, there would be no way for the researcher to determine if she entered voluntarily or semivoluntarily.

Accordingly, the finding that 25 percent of victims entered and remained in the channel voluntarily may be overstated, as some of them may have been pressured into it, and are, therefore, Peaceful Displacers rather than Willing Assimilators.

CONCLUSION

Victim Intervention Marketing was proposed as a branch of social activist marketing that discourages victims from entering and/or remaining in human trafficking distribution channels. The proposed human trafficking definition deviates from established definitions in that it recognizes multiple levels of trafficking

egregiousness based on the victim's voluntary, semivoluntary, or involuntary participation. Thus, this discussion addresses inconsistencies in the UN and U.S. definitions of human trafficking, which were designed to assist prosecutors rather than social marketers. Categories of victims and prescribed intervention influence strategies based on an attitude-behavior consistency framework (Frazier and Sheth 1985) were developed. To demonstrate the framework's applicability, trafficking cases from a UN database were placed into the nine categories.

These results are important because they offer direction for antihuman trafficking resource allocation, as they may help policymakers decide which resources should go to which cells. Moreover, the findings may provide the basis for a social marketing campaign that informs potential volunteers how risky their employment options may be.

The value of our proposed framework is that it incorporates and/or is consistent with aspects of a variety of human trafficking paradigms. It accommodates both sex and labor trafficking as society moves from its emphasis on sex trafficking to encompass labor as well (Chuang 2012). Second, voluntary participation avoids the problem of forcing participants into a *victim* status. Rather, it allows for participant agency (Weitzer 2014). Third, it avoids exploitation creep by incorporating levels of egregiousness. Thus, not all trafficking victims are categorized as slaves. Finally, intervention is consistent with the U.S. State Department's 4Ps paradigm of trafficking, wherein "rescue" is addressed.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The Frazier and Sheth (1985) attitude-behavior framework in the human trafficking context prescribes broad influence strategies to employ within each cell of the matrix. However, effective applications of those strategies are still required. The following are suggested.


Robert Cialdini's (2007) six key principles of persuasion might be useful in influencing potential human trafficking channel volunteers. For instance, how do *Commitment and Consistency* relate to debt bondage in Asia, or when accompanied by voodoo oaths in Africa?

Future research might also ask how applicable Macneil's Relational Norms (e.g., Role Integrity, Reciprocity, etc.) are to human trafficking channels. Does role integrity, for instance, reduce channel

exploitation? Similarly, can disruptive intervention strategies reduce *commitment* and *trust* (Morgan and Hunt 1994) and/or increase *conflict* (Eliashberg and Michie 1984; Lucas and Gresham 1985) to weaken trafficking channel relationships?

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